Some report that human rights are likely to be violated when poor countries sign up to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These violations apparently occur because ordinary people revolt against the neo-liberal policies that SAPs push. This study examines the effect of the actual flow of finances from the World Bank and the IMF, holding constant all other bank-based financial flows, on government respect for human rights. The authors find that pay-in periods are beneficial for human rights, whereas loan dry-ups correlate with violations. Loan dry-ups are likely to occur because of noncompliance with SAPs rather than implementation, since the international financial institutions (IFIs) release loans in tranches to solve the time inconsistency problem. The overall level of indebtedness is robustly related to human rights abuses, but the higher the stock of debt owed to IFIs relative to total debt, the lower the human rights violations. Accumulating debt to IFIs, thus, seems to improve the level of human rights. Additionally, a higher government consumption to GDP ratio reduces human rights, a result that does not suggest that governments that are capable of commanding a higher share of the country's wealth are less likely to face threatening social dissent. Moreover, a proxy for neo-liberal policies, the index of economic freedom, correlates strongly with better human rights. These results do not square well with the view that neo-liberal policy reforms and the attendant austerity measures drive dangerous dissent.
Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are severely castigated within public, academic and policy circles for contributing to human rights violations by pushing onerous conditionality on poor countries (Blustein, 2005; George, 1988; Milner, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 2006; Woods, 2006) . 1 Some scholars suggest that * We thank Thomas Oatley, Ola Listhaug, Paul Midford and several anonymous referees for comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. Only we are to blame for errors. We are particularly grateful to Rodwan Abouharb for generously sharing data. The replication data are available at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. The statistical software package STATA v10 was used in all analyses.
1 This study will refer collectively to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and 'other' loan-giving financial institutions as the international financial institutions (IFIs). The World Bank and the IMF impose conditionality on borrowing countries to ensure reform and repayment. The IDA offers loans on highly concessional terms to the poorest countries.
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volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009 486 structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) generate human rights violations because ordinary people oppose 'unsuitable' neo-liberal policies (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006 . The poor record of the international financial institutions (IFIs) for regenerating economic growth has led some to suggest that these institutions have perhaps outlived their usefulness and that they be abolished on the grounds that their policies may also end up killing people (Milner, 2005; Wade, 2006) . What is still unclear is whether it is the effects of IFI policies, or moral hazard, that generates human rights violations. After all, the high non-compliance with SAP policies is well documented ( Vreeland, 2006) . 2 This study addresses the pessimistic findings by examining the impact of actual flows of money from IFIs to asses whether or not the frequency and size of the disbursements of loans or the crises generated by indebtedness matter for human rights. This study also addresses the issue of whether neo-liberal policy features associated with the IFIs matter for human rights, an issue that is crucial to evaluating whether IFI loans or government non-implementation of recommended policies are to blame.
Previous studies use a dummy variable indicating whether or not a country signs a SAP. We believe that this discrete variable does not capture the nature of conditionality and the differential application of conditionality on borrowers, since many argue that the IFIs do not lend according to a blueprint but that they lend based on many considerations, including internal and external political pressure (Uvin, 2004; Woods, 2006) . In other words, some governments possess greater bargaining power and thereby enjoy loans of greater than normal economic importance and looser conditions (Dreher & Jensen, 2007; Stone, 2004; Thacker, 2006; Woods, 2006) . This would mean that a dummy variable flagging who signs SAPs misses the differential nature of conditionality applied to borrowers, the true nature of the crises faced by the governments, and the stringency with which the IFIs actually enforce conditionality and approve new loans (bailouts).
3 By using flows of loans from all IFIs for whom the World Bank reports data, we are able to isolate the effects of the World Bank's and the IMF's influence simultaneously from those of other flows of finance, particularly from the International Development Association (IDA), a special agency of the World Bank that lends to some of the poorest countries on highly concessional terms. This issue is important, because the problem with aid (and loans) is that money is fungible, and separating out the effects of the different lenders allows us to assess which way the nature of conditionality (harshness and looseness) matters for bad human rights outcomes. This study also gauges the effect of the total stock of debt owed to multilateral banks relative to total publicly guaranteed debt, which allows the estimation of the accumulated influence of multilaterals relative to other creditors on the domestic political environment. Finally, this study will directly examine the mechanism identified by the critics as to why IFIs cause human rights violations: does the size of government budgets and a proxy for neo-liberal policies matter for predicting human rights?
Our results indicate that receiving loans from the IFIs has positive effects on government respect for physical integrity rights. However, when loan payback exceeds fresh 2 A worldwide survey of 305 IMF programmes finds that 53% of cases failed to implement even 20% of the conditions (Killick, 1995) . The same author finds more than 70% non-compliance with World Bank programmes ( Killick, 1998) . He blames inadequate funding and lack of follow-through for the failure of IFIs.
that the share of education to GDP has no effect on rights, whereas higher government spending reduces rights, results that do not support the contention that the IFIs impact human rights because of cuts in government spending. Moreover, a proxy for neo-liberal policies, the index of economic freedom, correlates strongly with better human rights. These results do not square well with the view that neo-liberal policy reforms and the attendant austerity measures drive dangerous dissent.
6

Structural Adjustment and Human Rights
According to liberal scholars, international institutions allow multilateral cooperation among states, stabilizing the global economic system and providing some order in political relations among states in a system characterized by anarchy (Milner, 2005; Nye & Donahue, 2000; Russett & Oneal, 2001 ). These institutions provide valuable global public goods (Kanbur, 2006; Wyplosz, 1999) . The multilateral banks, however, do not sit very well with several segments of the international community (Milner, 2005) . They apparently wield enormous economic power over sovereign states (Pauly, 1998) . Neo-marxist critics of globalization, communitarians, and a good chunk of the NGO community argue that the economic policies of the IFIs generate wealth for some and that globalization through 'top-down' processes hurts rather than helps citizens in developing countries (Oatley, 2004; Rapley, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 2006; Woods, 2006) . Poor countries in crisis have little choice but new loans, repression is more likely, possibly because of political problems emanating from the crisis and the attendant distributional struggles.
4 Thus, at the point of receiving loans, the level of respect for human rights is positive, but it becomes negative if and when payback exceeds new disbursements. These painful payback periods are clear signs of crisis rather than implementation of SAPs, since loan disbursements occur when the IFIs feel that their terms have been met. Interestingly, the largest negative effect is for IDA loans, which are given on the most concessionary terms, whereas IMF and IBRD loans are largely non-concessionary and subject to the wishes of private creditors (Gould, 2006) . 5 The results tentatively support those who argue that 'easy money' from the IFIs may in fact lead to moral hazard problems that have serious repercussions (Dreher, 2004; Easterly, 2005) . Moreover, conditions emanating from the debt burden and government budget constraints seem to be associated with the dissent/repression nexus to greater degrees than the signing of conditionality agreements. If people really feared austerity, then dissent should be observed at its highest intensity at the time of borrowing (should activate potential losers). The results suggest that it is when new loans are not forthcoming that repression increases.
While the effect of total debt is robustly negatively related to higher human rights, the share of multilateral debt relative to total debt is positive, a result that certainly does not suggest that being indebted to IFIs is worse than debt in general. We find also 4 Because of the 'time inconsistency' problem, the IMF releases the promised loans in tranches. According to Vreeland (2006: 361) , 'the IMF disburses the first installment of the loan and begins to monitor compliance. If the IMF deems a country to be in compliance, subsequent loan disbursals are made.' 5 We collapse the concessional and non-concessional loans for the IMF and the RDBs. The bulk of the loans disbursed by these agencies are non-concessional. The correlation between non-concessional and the summed variables we use is r = 0.99 for both IMF and RDB loans, respectively. 6 The Economic Freedom Index correlates at r = 0.75 with the World Bank's CPIA 'structural policies cluster' for the year 2005 for which the World Bank reports data (World Bank, 2007) . The structural policies cluster includes trade, financial sector and business regulatory environment. Thus, the 'neo-liberal' preferences of international business seem to mirror the World Bank's structural policy preferences quite well.
journal of P EACE R ESEARCH
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009 488 loses. Poor countries are labour rich and capital poor, thus capitalists, who earn rents on their capital (the scarce factor), are likely to lose from neo-liberal reforms (Jakobsen & de Soysa, 2006; Jensen, 2003; Milner & Kubota, 2005) . Those who lose from structural adjustment policies (local capitalists) might attempt to block the reforms, while those who would gain from the reforms may attempt to promote them (Oatley, 2004) . Since bad policies of the past must have persisted because of rent-seeking -hence the crises that require IFI intervention -these rent seekers (for example, the military) might try to oppose policy change. Successful implementation of structural adjustment programmes has been constrained by the ability of governments to overcome opposition to reform from powerful domestic interests and to create new political coalitions based on the domestic groups that benefit from the new policy regime (Oatley, 2004: 164) . In other words, if IFI SAPs cause dissent, then who actually dissents is not clear. It could be the labour unions and priests, or dissent organized by local rent-seekers such as the capitalist elite and the military leaders, or urban interests against the countryside. We know of no study, thus far, that has directly tested the mechanisms identified as neo-liberal policy preferences on levels of human rights.
The question above is tightly connected with the question of compliance, which is a hard issue to address empirically (Vreeland, 2006) . Given that, this study examines how indebted countries do on human rights, in the absence of the money from IFIs. The level of debt, which is a strong predictor of crisis, may cause social and political upheaval because governments will be forced to service outstanding debt and face constraints on further borrowing. In other words, austerity is not just what IFIs propose in terms of financial policy, but the budget constraints of governments due to economic crisis and the lack of access to finance will exist whether or not to accept harsh conditionality. These conditions apparently impose policies that hurt the poor, leading to dissent and repression (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007). 7 Several recent empirical studies report negative effects on human rights from SAPs initiated by the IMF and World Bank ( Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006 . Structural adjustment policies apparently create losers among the population at large. Abouharb & Cingranelli (2005: 237-238) suggest that 'loan recipients' governments are expected to reduce their efforts to protect the social and economic rights of their citizens in a variety of areas, such as housing, health care, education …. Civil and political liberties will have to be curtailed in order to ease the implementation of loan conditions' [italics added]. The threats to leaders who promote adjustment policies come from labour unions, political opposition, religious groups, and other civil society organizations that protest such policies as onerous.
An alternative view as to how IFIs may generate human rights violations is that ruling elites, not the bulk of ordinary people, are opposed to reforms. The so-called neo-liberal policies that SAPs push should benefit labour over domestic capital in poor countries, since labour is the abundant factor. Farmers may benefit from the lifting of price controls, relative to city-people, for example. According to a basic Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardo-VinerSamuelson type model of trade openness, countries with abundant factors gain from greater openness, while the scarce factor 7 Who wins and loses from adjustment, or what short-term and long-term benefits mean, is hard to discern. If powerful elites have 'broken the bank', then they may want to displace the costs on the poor. Thus, conditionality, if complied with, may help the poor. On the other hand, IFI policies may directly hurt the poor because of the cuts in government services. However, given economic crisis and budget constraints on governments, it is not entirely clear whether the poor would receive these services in the absence of the IFI loans. A military may riot because of spending cuts for the military. Few, however, would defend higher military spending.
an additional model on human rights outcomes controlling for the predicted probabilities from the first regression. 8 We avoid this method on three principal grounds: First, our intention is to estimate actual flows of money, since the actual size of loans relative to GDP measures the degree of true austerity a government faces to a far greater extent than does a simple dummy variable. Secondly, signing a SAP (or time spent under a SAP) is a weak measure of compliance (see quotation from Vreeland above). The actual loan flows tell us something about why new loans were not forthcoming (for example, because of failure to comply). Third, selection models are highly sensitive to model specification and the presence of extreme values ( Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Winship & Mare, 1992) . In fact, some scholars have abandoned the selection models for more appropriate methods, such as matching and instrumental-variables techniques (Atoyan & Conway, 2006) . Using these more appropriate methods, Atoyan and Conway (2006) report evidence for improved economic growth among borrowers after the implementation phase of a SAP. 9 they turn to the IFIs -austerity by default (Bhagwati, 2004) . Such a condition would necessitate cuts in social spending and reduce benefits to those who are part of the equilibrium of high debt. Financial crises of the sort that require IFI intervention could produce repression since everyone will have cause to blame the government. The rent-seekers, usually better placed than ordinary people to dissent, as well as masses of city people, may find a common cause against austerity.
This study, however, is not about why governments run into crises, that is, who is to blame for the crisis, but it is primarily concerned about whether governments will be forced to repress (face threatening dissent), owing to financial pressure as a result of debt and fiscal crises. If they do, then IFI intervention may still save lives by easing budget constraints. The available studies on the effects of IFI lending on human rights do not account for the fiscal pressure a government faces; rather, they assume that if conditionality correlates with higher repression, the mechanism must be the severity of austerity measures proposed by the IFIs and distaste for so called neo-liberal openness among the people. None of these studies, however, have tested pro xies of neo-liberal policies on human rights directly, despite the fact that some report positive effects of trade openness and the openness to FDI on human rights (Apodaca, 2001; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001) .
Selection effects are an important issue methodologically for empirical studies addressing IFI conditionality on human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2005) . In other words, do IFIs choose the easier/harder cases? Abouharb & Cingranelli's (2006 thoughtful studies find that, after taking into account the probability of being selected for receiving SAP loans, the 'implementation' of IFI policies decreases human rights. Using a dummy variable indicating who signs SAPs, they first estimate the probability of signing a SAP and then estimate 8 Rather surprisingly, Abouharb & Cingranelli (2007) report that SAPs, after adjusting for selection, have positive effects on democracy, despite negative effects on human rights. Moreover, when selection effects are controlled, the physical quality of life index is negative and highly significant on human rights (Table 8 .1), more significant than the effect of signing on to a SAP! Can those policies they blame as 'neo-liberal' for generating human rights repression have similar effects as 'physical quality of life' factors? We suspect that their predicted probabilities of signing on to a SAP are highly correlated with per capita income, yielding these rather strange and contradictory results. Moreover, their test of SAPs on rebellion (civil war) shows no effect of income per capita (Table 7 .1), which severely contradicts the specialized literature on civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006) . For the moment, we can only guess at why they find some of these contradictory results, but we hope to take a more detailed look at these issues in future work. 9 The question of whether or not the IMF causes higher economic growth will continue to be debated, but this is marginal to our concerns as we include growth as a control in our models predicting human rights. Growth should have an independent effect on human rights, regardless of whether or not SAPs were in operation (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999 Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007) . However, the evidence suggests that IMF conditionality lowers the level of economic freedom and marketoriented reforms -the so-called neoliberal policy reforms that many blame for the negative correlations between signing on to an IMF programme and violations of human rights (Boockmann & Dreher, 2003; Dreher & Rupprecht, 2007) . Neither is there strong evidence to suggest that signing onto an IMF programme lowers socially beneficial public spending (Martin & Segura-Ubiergo, 2004) , nor that private capitalists, who would find these neo-liberal policies favourable to their needs, actually respond positively to IMF loans (Jensen, 2004) .
10 Why the composition of government budgets or proxies of neo-liberalism, such as the economic freedom index, have not been tested directly in models of human rights repression is a mystery. If SAPs are bad for human rights, why not test those aspects of SAPs directly in the models -that is, is the 'medicine' bad or is the 'patient' doomed regardless? This study fills this gap.
Why Human Rights?
Violations of physical integrity rights maybe considered 'crimes against humanity' ( Neumayer, 2005; Poe & Tate, 1994) . In the late 1990s, when the bubble burst in Argentina and the IMF announced that it would not extend more loans, the Argentine government was forced to devalue the currency and millions of people took to the streets. The government immediately announced a 'no repression' policy, signalling
In addition, the dummy variable used by other studies does not capture the importance of the loan to the receiver in the same way as actual flows of money do. Signing a conditionality agreement does not mean that the nature of the conditions is the same for all signatories, or that the years following the signing are synonymous with the 'implementation phase'. How does one know exactly that the 'patient' took the 'medicine', the so-called moral hazard problem (Meltzer Commission Report, 2002) . According to one scholar, the study of compliance with IMF conditionality is at the heart of the matter about whether or not IMF interventions work, which is an issue that is 'not straightforward. IMF agreements span many dimensions. Even along one dimension, governments are not held to the same standard' (Vreeland, 2006: 1) . A recent detailed account of the IMF's involvement in Argentina concludes thus;
The responsibility for this immensely consequential lapse [fiscal policy and budget measures] belongs first and foremost with Argentina itself .… Indeed, it is time to explode the myth that the IMF was dictating policy to Buenos Aires. (Blustein, 2005: 198-199) There seems to be quite a bit of evidence for the view that conditionality does not work and that moral hazard keeps bringing countries back for more loans (Bird & Mosley, 2006; Blustein, 2005; Calomiris, 2005; Collier & Gunning, 1999; Dreher, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Uvin, 2004) . We avoid the debate about whether or not the IFIs, such as the World Bank and the IMF, push the right policies, or whether or not they are victims of the bad faith of borrowers. We note that those who find a negative effect of conditionality usually blame 'neo-liberal' policies and the response of government agents to the dissent caused by slashing of government services. Austerity unfairly pushed on society is the mechanism that explains the 10 Of course, private investors may have better information on government compliance with IFI conditionalities. They may not always view conditionality as a credible device for making sure governments actually reform. The fact that capitalists do not respond readily to SAP environments raises doubts about arguments that suggest that it is 'neoliberal policy' that people dissent against, requiring repression (Dreher & Rupprecht, 2007) .
Following others, this analysis employs OLS regression with PCSE and an AR1 process to account for autocorrelation. We also use alternative tests that employ Newey-West standard errors, which assume a heteroskedastic error distribution and apply a TSCS equivalent of robust standard errors along with a correction for first-order autocorrelation (Gerring et al., 2005) .
Several studies include a lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999) . A lagged dependent variable is also meant to control for regional diffusion and spill-over effects (Neumayer, 2005) . There are two reasons for the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (LDV). The first, methodological, reason is to control for autocorrelation, endogeneity and omitted variables (Beck & Katz, 1995) . The second, theoretical, reason holds that governments tend to use past decisions as a baseline for their present decisions (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999) . The models are run with and without lagged dependent variables.
12 Finally, we estimate all models using year dummies to estimate any effects of trending data. Year enters linearly in the PCSE estimations.
Physical Integrity Rights
The physical integrity rights index (physint) reported in the Human Rights Database (CIRI data) contains information about the empirically derived pattern and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights in addition to the level. 13 The CIRI its commitment to democratic principles (Blustein, 2005 (Most & Starr, 1989; Poe, 2004) . 11 Leaders who make domestic policy decisions have perceptions of their regime's political strength and threats. Repression is just one of the actions that can be used by leaders who try to decrease threats (dissent) or/and increase its strengths. This simple dissent-repression model has been proposed in various ways by many scholars to predict the level of human rights, and it is ideally suited for testing propositions about the impact of economic crises and interventions of the IFIs on serious anti-government dissent (Gurr, 1986; Moore, 2000; Regan & Henderson, 2002) .
Methods
This study utilizes a pooled cross-sectional time-series (TSCS) dataset covering the years 1981 to 2003 for a sample of 104 developing countries. TSCS data often allows for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Beck & Katz, 1995) . Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of parameters do well in most situations, but estimates of standard errors are inaccurate for TSCS data. Beck and Katz (1995) propose to retain OLS parameter estimates but replace the OLS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). They find that these estimates of sampling variability are very accurate, even in the presence of complicated panel error structures.
11 This model assumes that decisionmakers are unified and value-maximizing actors who possess perfect information regarding their options and the consequences of their actions (Most & Starr, 1989: 126) . 12 Using a LDV, however, may soak up so much variance that theoretically interesting results are likely to get drowned out. Additionally, when a LDV is in the model, one is essentially estimating change in the dependent variable from year to year. Such a model complicates the interpretation of results. For example, going from 7 to 8 on the physint maybe a lot harder than going from 1 to 2, even though in both instances it is a 1-point change. We notice that Abouharb & Cingranelli (2007) include a LDV in all their estimations. 13 Pattern is defined as 'the association of different levels of government respect for several physical integrity rights
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Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), non-concessional and concessional loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), non-concessional and concessional loans from Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and loans from other financial institutions. Non-concessional and concessional loans are added into one category for the IMF and RDB (see footnote 4).
16 Net financial flows are defined as disbursements minus amortization, and interest. This net flow can be negative in periods when the interest and/ or principal repayments are larger than the disbursements. Consequently, the negative values are transformed into positive values for all the different types of loans and relabelled as 'payback periods'. Total accumulated debt as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) and the share of multilateral debt in total debt expressed as a percentage capture the importance of accumulated debt and the stock of debt owed to the multilateral banks (World Bank, 2006) .
Previous research on the violations of human rights has established that there are several key factors that explain why governments violate human rights (Carey & Poe, 2004; Landman, 2005) . The models control the effects of development by including per capita income (logged) and the economic growth rate (World Bank, 2006 ). They also contain the level of democracy, which enters as a discrete variable taking the value 1 if the POLITY IV variable, polity2, is greater than 6 on the 10-point scale, and 0 if not (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995) . Apparently, democracy affects rights only at very high levels ( Davenport & Armstrong, 2004) . Following others, we include the log of total population (World Bank, 2006) . Additionally, we account for data are based on the human rights practices of governments and any of its agents, such as police or paramilitary forces. 14 Cingranelli & Richards (1999) have generated a parallel analysis with the measures from the US State Department's Country Reports and Amnesty International's Annual Report by using Mokken scaling techniques that solve the potential difficulties inherent in placing several different behaviours on a single scale. 15 The parallel analysis allows a check on each measure against invalid findings that might arise owing to biases in either of the two reports. The CIRI measure is an additive index constructed from observations on torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no government respect for these four human rights, to 8, full government respect for these four human rights. While the physical integrity rights index is an ordinal scale, we follow the advice and practice of others by treating it as a linear variable because it is relatively normally distributed (Hamilton, 1992; Long, 1997; Winship & Mare, 1984) .
Key Independent Variables
The primary independent variable of this study is net flows of loans from the IFIs as a percentage of GDP. For our purposes, we need to capture the nature of financial pressure by capturing the presence/absence and size of the financial flows. Loans of the IFIs include loans from the International Bank for with a single, overall scale score' (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999: 408) . Sequence is defined as 'the order in which governments have a propensity to violate particular physical integrity rights' (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999: 408) . 14 The CIRI dataset uses ordinal scoring categories that rest on events-based criteria because these categories fit the accuracy of the data being reported (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999) . Others have used the standard-based approach (Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999) . 15 The reports of Amnesty International were considered to be the authoritative source of information in those cases where the two sources varied (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999) . 16 We take the current dollar values of all the loans and divide by current dollar GDP and multiply by 100 to express as percentage. The data are from the WDI data (World Bank, 2006) . Where values are negative, we transform to positive values and label them as 'payback'. quite a bit lower than the comparative effect of being indebted. The strong negative effect of oil exporters on PIR demonstrates that states whose revenues derive primarily from oil exports are more likely to repress physical integrity rights. The results are statistically highly significant. Generally, the two methods -the PCSE and Newey-West methodyield similar results.
In Table I , we present two models with the crucial net flows of loans from the IFIs added to the baseline model discussed above. The models include all the IFI loan variables, since we want to capture the impact of IMF and World Bank flows, net of other financial flows into a country. As seen there, the effects of net inflows of loans from the IMF, the IBRD and the IDA are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the larger the economic importance of these loans to the debtors, the lower the level of human rights violations. An increase of one percent in net inflow of loans from the IBRD relative to GDP increases government respect for physical integrity rights by approximately 0.24 percent in the NeweyWest method. Thus, the largest loan flow from the IBRD (6.3% of GDP) would raise PIR by 1.5 points, roughly one-half of the mean value of the PIR (see Appendix for summary statistics). Similarly, a maximum loan from the IDA (13% of GDP) associates with an increase in PIR by roughly 2 points, an effect that is greater than going from peace to having a civil war. These results cannot be taken to mean that the flows of loans cause respects for rights, but it certainly shows that the recipients of loans from the IBRD and IDA do not need to lower human rights at the point of borrowing, that is, dissent must be low! The results for IMF, RDB and other categories are not statistically significant, again, suggesting that recipients do not necessarily have lower rights than those not receiving financial flows from the IFIs. the degree of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and participation in civil and international war.
17 Unlike Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) , we include the years since the last civil and international war. The war data are from the UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) . In addition to these variables, oil export dependency, which is independently related to repression because of the so called 'resource curse', is also included in the models (de Soysa & Binningsbø, 2009; Ross, 2001) . Oil wealth is a dummy taking the value 1 if oil exports exceed one-third of export revenue, and 0 if not.
Results
This study reports both PCSE and NeweyWest estimations in all tests. First, the baseline model replicating previous studies is run, but including total debt to GDP (results not shown). 18 Our replication of Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) , but with total debt included, is highly comparable to their study. Total debt to GDP decreases physical integrity rights (PIR). The substantive impact of debt is not negligible. Holding all variables at their mean, raising debt by the highest value would decrease respect for PIR by roughly one point, which is 80% of the impact of having a civil war. This is a large impact, net of all the other factors in the model. The effects of population size, international war and civil war are statistically significant and negative, indicating that a large population and both types of militarized conflict decrease PIR. In our models too, income level and economic growth promote rights, but raising growth by the maximum value (25%), which is highly unrealistic, improves human rights by only 38% of the impact of having a civil war, 17 See, for example, Poe & Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) for theoretical justification for these variables. 18 We provide the replication data and do files to generate all the results that we discuss.
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volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009 494 the most concessional terms to borrowers. A percentage increase in loan payback to GDP (to the IDA) predicts a 4.6 point decrease in PIR. However, since the largest value for payback to IDA in our data is roughly one-half of one percent (0.57), the substantive impact of IDA payback would be roughly a decrease of 2.6 points, not a negligible amount.
We interpret these results as the effects of not getting new tranches of money, which would raise the spectre of budget crises and austerity. Since the payback of the most concessional lending seems to matter most, relative to the non-concessional lending, it suggests strongly that crises rather than
The results for paying back show a different picture, however. With the PCSE method, the IMF and IDA show negative effects on PIR, while with the Newey-West method, only IBRD and IDA are negative and statistically significant. Thus, governments saddled with large arrears have higher human rights violations than those receiving new loans. This does not mean these payments cause violations, but it may very well mean that it is crisis countries that face dissent -those that generally have large arrears and do not get fresh infusions of loans. Interestingly, IDA payback periods have the largest effect on violations, despite the fact that the IDA offers Results of all the controls in the baseline model not shown. z statistics in parentheses. Year dummies computed with the Newey-West method (not shown). *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
the stringency with which conditionalities are applied drive human rights violations. The control variables for these tests are basically the same as those reported previously (results not shown). Nevertheless, our results support the view that societies in financial crises suffer higher repression and that lending lowers it. Note that total debt is always statistically significant and robustly associated with lower respect for human rights.
19
In Table II , we test the models reported in Table I but include a lagged dependent variable. As seen there, the basic results show positive effects from positive flows and negative effects when arrears exceed new loans. Thus, our basic findings on loans flows hold up under extremely restrictive conditions.
In Table III , we enter the accumulated debt of multilateral banks relative to total publicly guaranteed debt. As seen there, a larger share of debt owed to multilaterals increases respect for physical integrity rights. An increase of the share of debt owed to multilaterals by the largest value increases respect for rights by almost one point. Given that total debt is consistently bad and the poor have to borrow from somewhere, then our results suggest that owing debt to the multilaterals improves human rights. This result throws into question the idea that implementation of conditionality, or its socalled harshness, is what drives a negative association between signing a SAP and lower human rights. If this were the case, then a larger share of the debt owed to multilaterals 19 Our results are not dependent on controlling for selection effects. We obtained the predicted probabilities of signing an IMF SAP generated by Abouharb & Cingranelli (2007) and used them in our models (we are deeply grateful to Rodwan Abouharb for sharing data). The effects of payback to IMF and the IBRD remain statistically significant and strong, whereas only positive flows from the IDA remain significant. Cursory examination of our measures shows that many countries that have signed SAPs have never received actual loans. It might be that some initial signatories abandon reform and do not get loans, or were denied loans subsequent to signing for whatever reason. Such issues, too, will not be captured by estimating the simple dummy. 20 The effect of economic freedom on human rights is robust to the inclusion of the predicted probabilities of selection into SAPs.
to GDP, and an index of economic freedom generated by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney & Lawson, 2005) . This index is created out of 22 measures of market-friendly policies spanning both economic and institutional factors.
Other scholars have used this measure to gauge the effects of IMF lending on market-oriented reforms (Boockmann & Dreher, 2003) . If the critics are correct, we would expect to find the share of government spending to GDP and education spending's share to matter positively with rights, and the index of economic freedom to associate negatively. As seen in Table IV , in the baseline model, both education spending to GDP and the share of total government to GDP have no statistically significant impact on the level of human rights in our sample of developing countries. In Column 2, government consumption share is negative and approaches statistical significance (z = 1.35). In Column 3, however, controlling for education spending, total government share per GDP is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. A one standard deviation increase in government consumption to GDP reduces PIR by more than 1 point. In Column 4, the economic freedom index is positive for human rights and statistically significant below the 1% level. 20 We cannot speculate here on Panel-corrected z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Conclusion
The success of globalization requires good institutions for managing growing interdependence. Solving political dilemmas associated with economic crises among the poor and indebted countries is normatively and practically valuable. For many, the powerful, faceless IFIs are a menace (George, 1988) . For others, the IFIs provide the public good of keeping the international financial system stable, by monitoring and coordinating the flow of financial resources. Thus, they are potential allies of the poor and politically weak, who need physical capital for development (Milner, 2005) . Political philosophers, such as Thomas Pogge, remind us that the rich are morally obliged to help the poor in a globalizing world where the fate of the rich and poor are evermore intertwined (Pogge, 2002) . Thus, if institutions such as the IMF actually hurt the poor, despite providing us (the rich) with financial stability, then we are complicit in the violations of universal human rights and principles. Only careful analysis of empirical realities generated by the IFIs should be used to gauge the usefulness, both normative and practical, of the IFIs' role in global affairs (Milner, 2005) . These realities should then guide how we reform the IFIs or, in fact, whether we get rid of them altogether. We have gauged the effects of the IFI financial flows on respect for human rights, which is a priority for generating good governance, peace and development (Sen, 1999) , and we find that their loans are associated with increasing human rights, but these rights deteriorate when countries face financial crises.
Previous studies find that signing structural adjustment programmes associates with lower respect for rights, particularly after adjusting for selection effects (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006 . They conclude that opposition to neo-liberal policies and the harshness of conditionality drives dissent. By gauging the effects of actual loan disbursements for which combination or set of combinations of the 22 dimensions of economic freedom drives the correlation with human rights, but the most prominent proxy for marketoriented reforms that the critics of IFIs claim cause human rights violations yields exactly the opposite results. Economic freedom, net of per capita income, with which it is quite highly correlated, increases human rights. We leave it to future research to examine more closely the positive connection between human rights and economic freedom. Additionally, controlling for country size, per capita income, the oil exporter dummy variable and the level of democracy, we regress our loan flows on education spending and government (results not shown). None of our loan flows seem to explain lower education spending or total size of government, results which are generally supported by others (Dreher, 2004 (Dreher, , 2005 Martin & SeguraUbiergo, 2004) .
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all the models, adding total aid to GNI (World Bank, 2006) to test its effect against flows of IFI loans. Aid, particularly bilateral aid, is supposed to complement government budgets in areas such as education and health. Aid's effect is statistically far from significant, but our basic results showing that positive loan flows matter positively for rights and negative loan flows matter negatively, do hold up. Next, we test our models using the ordered logit method. As PIR is a 9-point scale, we ran our basic models using ordered logit clustered on country to minimize serial correlation. Once again, our basic results hold up -positive human rights effects for positive loan flows and negative for loan dryups, particularly strongly for IDA loans. We tested all our models for multicolinearity by gauging the variance inflation factor scores (VIFs). None of our variables showed scores higher than 10, and the average scores of the models did not exceed the recommended cutoff point of 4.
all IFIs relative to actual debt, we are able to identify what happens when loan disbursements dry up, which generally means that the IFIs decided not to disburse more loans because of non-implementation, or some other reason. Our estimations show clearly that positive loans increase respect for human rights while negative ones lower them. If policies actually hurt enough to generate severe dissent that requires violent suppression of rights, we cannot believe that such dissent will not be manifest when loans are actually being disbursed, that is, the IFIs are actually happy with the government's reform plans, if not early attempts at compliance.
Moreover, a higher share of debt owed to multilaterals associates with better human rights levels, whereas the total debt burden is robustly negative. Our results may support those who argue that easy money to bad governments dissuades them from reforming, which results in deepening debt and the onset of crisis (Calomiris, 2005; Dreher & Rupprecht, 2007; Easterly, 2005) . This problem requires thinking hard about how to stem the moral hazard problem. Our proxies for neo-liberal policy, such as the 'economic freedom index', correlate positively and robustly with better human rights. Thus, the so called 'medicine' of the IFIs is unlikely to be the problem. As Easterly (2005) reminds us, Haiti had debt forgiven as far back as the 1890s, long before the existence of IFIs, but Haiti's people have seen little reform and continue to suffer debt, poverty and misery. Given that our results show that owing debt to multilaterals rather than others is also beneficial in terms of better rights, we submit that borrowing from IFIs cannot be 'a fate worse than debt', as some critics claim. 
